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Adequate Protection Under the
Bankruptcy Code, Its Role in Business
Reorganization
ANDREW N. KARLEN*
I. Introduction
A major problem under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was
the question of debtor-in-possession's or trustee's right after
the commencement of a reorganization case to use property that
collateralized a debt:8 what form of protection would best satisfy
competing interests" enabling and encouraging the debtor to re-
organize and protecting the rights of secured creditors. The
problem was of constitutional dimensions; the Supreme Court
has held that, following the filing of a bankruptcy petition, se-
cured creditors are entitled to protection of their rights in collat-
eral.5 The Act, which did not deal with the use by a debtorO of
* LL.M., 1981, New York University School of Law;, J.D., 1973, New York Law
School; B.S., 1969, University of Bridgeport; Associate, Keane & Beane, P.C., White
Plains, New York; formerly, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District
of New York; Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission.
1. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (formerly at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103
(1976))[hereinafter referred to as the Act].
2. Absent a court order to the contrary, a debtor will remain in possession of and
operate its business in a reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code of
1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107-1108 (Supp. I1 1979). Accordingly, as used herein, the term
debtor will encompass debtors-in-possession as well as reorganization trustees.
3. King & Bauman, Bankruptcy Law, 1978 ANN. Stiry. OF AM. L. 363, 369.
4. Shanor, A New Deal For Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 28 EMoRY L.J. 587,
620 (1979).
5. Wright v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940); Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); Shanor, supra note 4. Constitutional
issues involved in the use of collateral by a debtor during a reorganization arise from the
1
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encumbered property provided the courts little, if any, guidance
in striking an appropriate balance between these interests.'
The Bankruptcy Code of 1978,8 which became effective on
October 1, 1979, significantly affected this area through the me-
dium of "adequate protection." The concept of adequate protec-
tion under the Code focuses on the collateral's value and the se-
cured party's expectation of receiving that value; whereas in
reclamation proceedings under the Act, the focus was on the
right to receive the collateral itself. Adequate protection tem-
pers the protection and powers afforded the debtor by section
362 of the Code,10 the automatic stay provision, which operates
to stay all attempts, except through the bankruptcy proceedings,
to enforce the debtor's monetary obligations, and by sections
36311 and 364,' which, respectively, permit the debtor to use,
sell or lease the debtor's property and obtain secured credit dur-
ing the pendency of the bankruptcy case. If another's interest in
property might be adversely affected, adequate protection is a
required condition for "the continuation of a stay under section
362; the use, sale or lease of property under section 363, and the
giving of security for a credit obligation under section 364. s13
The Code does not define adequate protection. Section
361,14 however, sets forth the following examples of adequate
protection: periodic cash payments; additional or replacement
liens; and such other means as will provide the secured creditor
with the "indubitable equivalent" of its interest in the debtor's
property.
fifth amendment prohibitions against the taking of private property without due process
of law. A detailed discussion of these issues is not within the scope of this article.
6. Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under The New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. hCH. J. L.
REF. 3, 43 n. 178 (1979).
7. Use Of Secured Creditors' Collateral In Chapter X Reorganizations: A Proposed
Modification Of The Commission's and Judges' Bills, 1 J. CoRP. L. 555, 557 (1975-76)
[hereinafter cited as A Proposed Modification].
8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter referred to as the Code].
Hereafter, all section numbers will refer to sections of the Bankruptcy Code unless oth-
erwise indicated.
9. Shanor, supra note 4, at 621.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
11. Id. § 363.
12. Id. § 364.
13. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 43 n. 178.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 361.
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ADEQUATE PROTECTION
This article will examine the concept of adequate protection
under the Code, especially in the context of Chapter 11 reorgani-
zations. 10 Section I of this article provides an historical analysis
of the concept of adequate protection. Section II discusses sec-
tion 361 of the Code and its legislative history. Section III exam-
ines the function of the adequate protection concept in the con-
text of business reorganizations by considering the situations in
which adequate protection is required pursuant to sections 362,
363 and 364, and relevant cases. Finally, Section IV provides a
brief discussion of some potential problems concerning adequate
protection faced by debtors, secured creditors, and others.
II. Historical Perspective
The Bankruptcy Act did not deal with the debtor's use after
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy of encumbered property.
The Act's provisions concerning stays, injunctions, sales, leases,
and issuance of certificates of indebtedness included no require-
ment of adequate protection.16 Adequate protection, however,
was provided for objecting classes of creditors in Chapters X and
XII1 7 reorganizations after confirmation of a plan over such
class's dissent. Section 216(7) of Chapter X and section 461(11)
of Chapter XII of the Act each provided for the so-called "cram-
ming down" of a plan by providing a dissenting class with "ade-
quate protection for the realization by them of the value of their
claims against the property dealt with by the plan."18
This adequate protection provided by the Act differed from
the adequate protection during the reorganization contemplated
by the Code. Under the Act, adequate protection was afforded at
15. One of the Code's major departures from prior law under the Act is the consoli-
dation, into one chapter, of all provisions governing business reorganizations. Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code replaces and modernizes the following chapters of the Act.-
Chapter X (corporate reorganizations) §§ 101-276 of the Act, 52 Stat. 883; Chapter XI
(arrangements) §§ 301-399 of the Act, 52 Stat. 905; and Chapter XII (real property ar-
rangements by a noncorporate debtor) §§ 401-526 of the Act, 52 Stat. 916. Chapter 11 of
the Code utilizes concepts contained in former Chapters X and XI, as well as some new
concepts. King & Bauman, supra note 3, at 368.
16. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 43 n.178.
17. Former Chapter X, §§ 101-276 of the Act, 52 Stat. 883; and Chapter XH, §§ 401-
526 of the Act, 52 Stat. 916. Hereafter, references to Chapters X, XI and XH will refer to
Chapters X, XI and XII of the Bankruptcy Act, see supra note 15.
18. 2 COLLIER ON BANKR. 1 361.01 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 2 CoLL=za].
19821
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the time of confirmation of a reorganization plan when a failure
to provide adequate protection would leave the affected creditor
without redress."B The Code provides adequate protection at an
earlier stage, when the issue will not be susceptible to the de-
tailed inquiry it would receive at the time of confirmation. On
the other hand, an inadequacy in the protection afforded a cred-
itor is more likely to be corrected if the protection is provided at
an earlier stage than if it is provided at the time of confirmation.
In dealing with adequate protection issues under the Code, the
courts initially looked to cases under the Act dealing with stays,
use, sale, and lease of property and the obtaining of credit rather
than to cases under the Act dealing with adequate protection.20
In the pre-Code case In re Yale Express Systems, Inc.,2" the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit permitted
liberal continued use of collateral. The court balanced the inter-
ests of the secured creditor against the interests of the debtor
and the public in obtaining a successful reorganization. The
debtor had defaulted on payments on a debt secured by a chat-
tel mortgage on vehicles the debtor had purchased from the se-
cured creditor. Subsequent to the default, the debtor filed a re-
organization petition and the secured creditor commenced a
reclamation proceeding for the vehicles. For reasons that were
not* clearly stated in its opinion, the district court denied the
reclamation petition.2 On appeal by the secured creditor, the
Second Circuit remanded the case for further consideration of
whether the equities favored the debtor's interim use of the col-
lateral.2 8 The Second Circuit noted that even if the district court
on remand concluded that the debtor should retain the collat-
eral, the court could provide other relief to the secured creditor,
such as requiring the debtor to make rental payments. 24 On re-
mand the district court did not compel the debtor to make
rental payments because the court found that successful reor-
ganization was a reasonable possibility and that the collateral
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. In re Yale Express Syss., Inc. (Yale Express II), 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967).
22. In re Yale Express Syss., Inc., 250 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
23. In re Yale Express Syss., Inc., (Yale Express I), 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966).
24. Id. at 439.
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ADEQUATE PROTECTION
was crucial to the reorganization.25 The court of appeals ac-
cepted these findings and held that if the secured creditor were
damaged by the debtor's use of collateral, the creditor would re-
ceive "equitable consideration," an administrative priority, in
the reorganization plan.' 6 -
The Yale Express decision was justifiably criticized as mak-
ing loss to the secured creditor a near certainty by permitting
the debtor to use depreciating collateral for a marginally secured
debt. 7 The secured creditor received no protection, and was left
with the speculative hope that he would receive "equitable con-
sideration" in the reorganization plan. Yale Express would be
decided differently under the Code. An administrative priority
as a method of providing adequate protection was rejected by
the Code's drafters "because such protection is too uncertain to
be meaningful."'s2 Under the Code, in the absence of adequate
protection, the secured creditor would be entitled to relief from
the automatic stay." The Yale Express cases, however, were the
vanguard of a move to provide genuine creditor protection.s"
The discussions of the possibility of rental payments and of the
competing equities favoring the debtor and those favoring the
secured creditor were significant in the evolution of the concept
of adequate protection.
In a factually similar case before the Second Circuit, In re
Bermec Corporation,31 the collateral involved was vehicles pur-
chased and leased in the course of the debtor's business. The
court permitted the debtor to continue leasing the vehicles and
collecting the rents. Debtor's use was conditioned, however,
25. The court rationalized that if rental payments were made other secured credi-
tors could demand such payments resulting in depletion of debtor's operating collateral
and frustration of the reorganization effort. These facts are reported in In re Yale Ex-
press System, Inc. (Yale Express H), 384 F.2d at 991-92.
26. Id. at 992. For an excellent discussion of the Yale Express decisions, see A Pro-
posed Modification, supra note 7, at 571-72.
27. Murphy, Use of Collateral In Business Rehabilitations: A Suggested Redrafting
of Section 7-203 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 63 CAL. L. Rzv. 1483, 1494 (1975). Mur-
phy suggested that Yale Express II had little support in prior bankruptcy law and vio-
lated the secured creditor's fifth amendment rights. Id. at 1494 n. 71.
28. S. RaP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sesa. 49, 54 (1978) [hereinafter cited as S. RaP.],
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 5787.
29. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).
30. A Proposed Modification, supra note 7, at 572.
31. 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971).
1982]
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upon payment to the secured creditor of an amount equal to the
economic depreciation of the collateral during the use period. As
in Yale Express, the Second Circuit balanced the secured credi-
tors' interests against the "congressional mandate to encourage
attempts at corporate reorganizations."''1 The pre-reorganization
depreciation payments ordered by the Bermec court to "approx-
imately . . preserve . . . [the secured creditors'] status quo ' 8
are more consistent with the Code's concept of adequate protec-
tion than are the rental payments authorized in Yale Express.
In July 1973 the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States submitted its report," which included recom-
mendations for changes in the bankruptcy laws,35 and a pro-
posed statute optimistically called the Bankruptcy Act of 1973."
Section 7-203 of the proposed Act, concerning the use of prop-
erty leased or subject to a lien, included the following concept of
adequate protection:
[A] secured party or lessor may file a complaint... to modify
the stay by imposing such conditions on the use of the property
or the proceeds thereof as will adequately protect the secured
party. The trustee or debtor shall have the burden of proving that
the value of the secured creditor's interest in the property or the
property leased as of the date of the petition is adequately
protected. 7
The commission, which did not attempt to codify the case
law with respect to the adequacy of protection in any given situ-
ation, left the courts to develop the concept on a case by case
basis.3 8 The commission did suggest, however, conditions which
courts might impose in appropriate circumstances, including: re-
32. Id. at 369.
33. Id.
34. In 1970, as a result of hearings held in 1968, Congress created the Commission to
study, analyze, evaluate and recommend changes in bankruptcy legislation, Pub. L. No.
91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
35. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as the REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION].
36. Id. The Commission's proposed statute was accompanied by explanatory notes
containing specific findings and representations. H. MxnUX & M. COOK, A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO THE BANKRuPTcy REFORM ACT 6-7 (1979).
37. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 236.
38. Id. at 237 n.3.
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quiring other security of equivalent value; requiring additional
security to the extent of the anticipated decrease in the collat-
eral's value as a result of use when the debtor had marginal or
no equity in the collateral; and giving a priority if it is clear that
the proceeds from the liquidation of the estate's available prop-
erty will be sufficient to pay the claim.8 The impact of the com-
mission's proposed codification of the adequate protection con-
cept and of the Yale Express and Bermec cases was evident in
the following pre-Code decisions.
In re Blazon Flexible Flyer, Inc.,"° is illustrative of the
principle that adequate protection is a fluid concept dependent
on the circumstances evident during its application. In Blazon,
the district court, in affirming an order of the bankruptcy court,
held that a secured creditor was "adequately protected" by the
following factors: a $4,391,000.00 excess of the security over the
debt; a requirement imposed by the bankruptcy court that the
debtor transmit financial information to the secured creditor
and the court; and the retention by the bankruptcy court of con-
trol over the case to permit revision of its orders on short notice
if circumstances changed to the secured creditor's detriment."'
The court thus fashioned adequate protection for the secured
creditor without compelling the debtor to make payments or
give a lien that could complicate the reorganization effort.
In In re American Kitchen Foods, Inc.," the court pro-
tected secured creditors by replacement and additional liens.
The debtor tendered and the court authorized additional collat-
eral to indemnify the secured creditors against any diminution
of their collateral resulting from the debtor's continued reten-
tion and use. Citing Blazon, among other cases, Bankruptcy
Court Judge Cyr held that there was no unconstitutional impair-
ment of the rights of secured creditors; the original collateral,
combined with the additional collateral proffered, sufficiently se-
cured the debt.'8
While the Yale Express, Bermec, Blazon Flexible Flyer and
39. Id. at 237 n.2.
40. 407 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
41. Id. at 864-65.
42. 9 CoLLmR BANK. CAs. (MB) 537 (Bankr. D. Me. 1976).
43. Id. at 547.
1982]
7
PACE LAW REVIEW
American Kitchen Foods cases were not the only pre-Code cases
to deal with the issue of a debtor's use of collateral during the
course of a reorganization effort,"4 these cases had significant im-
pact on the legislative process which led to the Code's
enactment.
III. Adequate Protection Under The Code
A. Introduction
The Code provides an important assurance for entities with
interests in a debtor's property; as long as adequate protection is
required, "although their remedies may be suspended or abro-
gated, and they may lose their rights in particular collateral, the
value of their secured position at the time of the commencement
of the case will be protected throughout the case."' 45 As dis-
cussed below, adequate protection may be required for the con-
tinuation of the automatic stay," for the debtor's use, sale or
lease of estate property,47 and for the granting of a senior lien on
collateral in order to obtain credit.4" Section 361 provides illus-
trations of what may constitute adequate protection:
When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363
or 364 of this title of an interest of an entity in property, such
adequate protection may be provided by
(1) requiring the trustee to make periodic cash payments to
such entity, to the extent that the stay under section 362 of this
title, use, sale, or lease under section 363 of this title, or any grant
of a lien under section 364 of this title results in a decrease in the
value of such entity's interest in such property;
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien
to the extent that such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant results in a
decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such property; or
44. The following pre-Code cases support the proposition that, if the secured credi-
tor's status quo cannot be preserved or protected in the interim, the collateral may not
be used: In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 198 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1952); Reconstruction
Finance Corp. v. Kaplan (In re Waltham Watch Co.), 185 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1950); In re
Gen. Stores Corp., 147 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); cases cited in A Proposed Modifi-
cation, supra note 7, at 573-76.
45. 2 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 361.01.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).
47. Id. § 363(e).
48. Id. § 364(d)(1).
[Vol. 2:1
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(3) granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity
to compensation allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title as
an administrative expense, as will result in the realization by such
entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in
such property.4 '
The drafting of section 361 indicates a primary concern with
the most commonly litigated interests of secured creditors; how-
ever, lessors, owners, or co-owners of property of the debtor may
also demand adequate protection." Moreover, adequate protec-
tion extends to both legal and equitable interests such as "a
right to redeem under a pledge or a right to recover property
under a consignment.""1 Adequate protection will extend, how-
ever, only to the amount of a creditor's allowed secured claim. 52
Also, valueless junior unsecured deficiency claims will not be en-
49. Id. § 361.
50. Id. Further, a secured creditor with a right of setoff pursuant to section 553 is
entitled to adequate protection. See In re Princess Baking Corp., 5 Bankr. 587 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1980). In addition, a subordination agreement, although enforceable in bank-
ruptcy pursuant to section 510(a), will not abrogate certain rights, which the Code guar-
antees to all secured creditors, such as adequate protection. See In re Hart Ski Mfg. Co.,
5 Bankr. 734 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
51. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 43-44 (1977)[hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP.], reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963; S. REP., supra note 28.
One court has recently observed that:
[Tihis classification is important because adequate protection depends upon the
interest and property involved. Protection afforded a lessor, for example, may be
different than that afforded a secured creditor. Treatment of a secured creditor
who faces turnover may be different from treatments of a secured creditor who
has not repossessed. Treatment of a senior lienholder may be different from treat-
ment of a junior lienholder. Similarly, protection may vary if the property is real
or personal, tangible or intangible, perdurable or perishable, or if its value is con-
stant, depreciating, or subject to sudden or extreme fluctuations. Also relevant is
the proposed use or idleness of the property.
In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) provides, in part, that:
[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien ...is a secured claim to the
extent of the value of such creditor's interest in. . .such property. . . and is an
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest .. is less
than the amount of such allowed claim.
Any unsecured portion of a partially secured claim will not receive protection. 2 COLLWE,
supra note 18, at 361.01. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2) permits creditors to elect to have their
claims treated as secured claims to the full extent of the allowed claim, rather than to
the extent of the collateral as under section 506(a). A creditor who has made an election
under section 1111(b)(2) is entitled to adequate protection limited to the value of the
collateral and not to the extent of the creditor's allowed secured claim. 124 CONG. REc.
H11,092 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REc. S17,409 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
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titled to adequate protection" since only the value of an entity'sint rest is protected.
B. Section 361 Methods of Adequate Protection
Section 361 is structured to illustrate "methods of adequate
protection and to define the contours of the concept." While
adequate protection, when requested by the appropriate parties,
is a matter of right, not discretion, 55 section 361 does not require
that a court devise a method of adequate protection because to
do so would place the court in an administrative role. Rather,
section 361 provides the basis upon which a court can determine
the adequacy of a debtor's proposed method of adequate protec-
tion in those circumstances in which a party affected by such
proposal objects to it.56
Although adequate protection is derived from the fifth
amendment's protection of property interests, Congress did not
intend that the concept be strictly confined to the minimum
protection required by the Constitution. Section 361 and ade-
quate protection are also based on policy grounds; "secured
creditors should not be deprived of the benefits of their bar-
gains. 1 5 At the same time, the drafters recognized that giving
secured creditors the absolute benefit of their bargains some-
times would be impossible, or would be seriously detrimental to
the policies underlying the bankruptcy laws. In order to facili-
tate a debtor's rehabilitation, section 361 authorizes an alternate
means of protecting secured creditors' interests. While a secured
creditor might not be permitted to retain a lien on specific col-
lateral, adequate protection attempts to ensure that a secured
creditor will receive the value for which he bargained."
Section 361 sets forth three non-exclusive, non-exhaustive
methods of adequate protection: periodic cash payments, addi-
tional or replacement liens, and indubitable equivalence.59
53. 2 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 1 361.01.
54. H.R. REP., supra note 51, at 338.
55. Id. at 343-44; S. REP., supra note 28, at 52-53.
56. H.R. REP., supra note 51, at 338; S. REP., supra note 28, at 49.
57. H. REP., supra note 51, at 339; S. Rzp., supra note 28, at 49, 53.
58. H.R. REP., supra note 51, at 339; S. REP., supra note 28, at 53.
59. 11 U.S.C. § 361.
[Vol. 2:1
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1. Periodic Cash Payments
Section 361(1) proposes periodic cash payments as a method
of providing adequate protection. Such payments are contem-
plated to the extent that the automatic stay, use, sale, lease or
granting of a lien causes a decrease in the affected entity's inter-
est in the property. Ordinarily, the secured party's interest will
be protected against a decrease in value in the collateral. 0 The
drafters noted that periodic cash payments, in the amount of the
depreciation, would be appropriate if the collateral is depreciat-
ing at a relatively fixed rate, a method derived from the Yale
Express case,6 I and from the Bermec case.
2. Additional Or Replacement Liens
As a method of adequate protection, section 361(2) suggests
additional or replacement liens to the extent of the decrease in
value or actual consumption of the property involved. This
method provides, through granting an interest in additional
property, for the realization of the pre-bankruptcy value of the
property if such property declines in value during the case.63 As
noted by the drafters, this device is consistent with the view that
adequate protection is designed to protect the value of a secured
creditor's collateral, not his rights in specific collateral." In In re
American Kitchen Foods, Inc.,65 a pre-Code example of the type
of situation in which this method would be appropriate, the se-
cured creditors were given a secured claim against all of the
debtors' assets which the court found exceeded the debt.
3. Indubitable Equivalent
Section 361(3) provides a method permitting such other re-
60. 2 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 361.01.
61. H.R. REP., supra note 51, at 339. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
62. In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971). See supra notes 31-34 and
accompanying text. In Bermec, the trustee offered to "pay the economic depreciation on
the secured creditor's equipment to approximately preserve their status quo." See S.
REP., supra note 28, at 54.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 361(2); H.R. REP., supra note 51, at 339-40; S. REP., supra note 28,
at 54.
64. S. REP., supra note 28, at 54.
65. In re American Kitchen Foods, Inc., 9 COLLIER BANKE. CAS. (MB) 537 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1976). See supra text accompanying notes 42 & 43.
1982]
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lief as will result in the affected entity receiving the "indubitable
equivalent" of its interest in the collateral. The "indubitable
equivalent" alternative was derived from the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in In re
Murel Holding Co.,"' a 1935 case involving adequate protection
for a class of creditors dissenting from the confirmation of a re-
organization plan." There the Second Circuit stated:
It is plain that "adequate protection" must be completely com-
pensatory; and that payment ten years hence is not generally the
equivalent of payment now. Interest is indeed the common mea-
sure of the difference, but a creditor who fears the safety of his
principal will scarcely be content with that; he wishes to get his
money or at least the property. We see no reason to suppose that
the statute was intended to deprive him of that in the interest of
junior holders, unless by a substitute of the most indubitable
equivalence."
The "indubitable equivalence" method makes adequate pro-
tection a flexible concept adaptable to the various circumstances
in which it is applied. 9 This method defines adequate protection
conceptually and more clearly than the other methods of section
361, requiring such relief as will result in the realization of the
value to be protected.7
Section 361(3) requires a mere "indubitable equivalence,"
rather than the "most indubitable equivalence" required by
Murel.71 This standard allows "ample room for case by case de-
66. In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935). See also In re American
Mariner Indus., Inc. 10 Bankr. 711 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981).
67. Here the court did not allow a cramming down of a plan because no adequate
protection was provided for dissenting mortgagees. The Second Circuit reversed the im-
position of a stay of joint foreclosure of an apartment building because the two bankrupt
corporate owners failed to prove that they could provide adequate protection for the
mortgagee's interests. The court noted that adequate protection could be provided by
four methods: 1) keeping the liens at status quo; 2) selling the property and attaching a
lien to the proceeds; 3) paying the appraised value of the liens; or 4) any method devised
through judicial discretion. None of these methods of protection had been provided by
the debtor. In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d at 942. This case may provide precedent
for issues arising upon confirmation of a plan, rather than for adequate protection issues.
See In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 10 Bankr. 711 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
68. In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d at 942.
69. H.R. Rp., supra note 51, at 340.
70. Id.
71. In re Mural Holding Corp., 75 F.2d at 942.
[Vol. 2:1
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ADEQUATE PROTECTION
velopment of adequate protection. ''7 2 Courts can adapt to new
financing methods and fashion appropriate relief according to
the circumstances of a given case7 8 such as allowing a third per-
son's guarantee outside the judicial process of compensation for
any loss incurred in the case. Secured creditors can bid in their
claims during the sale of the collateral and these claims will be
offset against the price finally bid in.74 Where a reserve fund is
maintained under a security agreement, as in the typical bond-
holder case, "indubitable equivalence" would entail the protec-
tion of the bond-holders for the regular payments needed to ser-
vice the debt as well as the reserve fund. 5
Adequate protection can involve imposing upon the debtor
duties or conditions which are quite different from the illustra-
tions set forth in section 361.7 For example, collateral com-
prised of inventory or receivables may be adequately protected
either by an ongoing accounting to the creditors or by segrega-
tion of cash proceeds." At times, adequate protection may be
achieved indirectly by requiring the debtor to make payments to
superior lienholders or to pay the taxes on, or operation ex-
penses of, the collateral. 78 The form of adequate protection af-
forded in a given case may also depend upon the nature of the
"entity" to be protected. For example, an institutional lender
may be adequately protected by a debt service moratorium to-
gether with measures designed to preserve the collateral's value.
If the debt secured by the collateral, however, is a retired per-
son's principal asset, periodic payments may be the only way to
adequately protect his interest.79
Section 361(3) expressly excludes the granting of compensa-
72. H.R. REP., supra note 51, at 340.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 124 CONG. REc., H11,092 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. RFC. S17,408-09
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
76. See supra text accompanying note 49.
77. 2 COLLIER, supra note 15, at 361.01.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 361.13. Bankruptcy courts now have the full powers of a court of equity,
law or admiralty. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. III 1979), as amended by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 92 Stat. 2671. Further, the bankruptcy
courts are empowered to issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or ap-
propriate to carry out the provisions of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 105.
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tion under section 503(b)(1)80 for administrative expenses as a
method of providing the "indubitable equivalent" of a party's
interest in property."1 The House of Representatives drafts of
the Code would have followed the suggestion of the Yale Ex-
press case and permitted the providing of adequate protection
by giving a secured party an adminstrative priority to the extent
of any decrease in the value of collateral.8' This method was re-
jected because "[iun every case there is the uncertainty that the
estate will have sufficient property to pay administrative ex-
penses in full."88 Under section 507(b)," however, if protection
is provided and later proves to have been inadequate, a secured
creditor's claim receives first priority over all other allowable
claims which are entitled to distribution under section
507(a)(1). 85 Such a priority is subordinate only to superpriorities
granted under section 364(c)(1); it will be senior to other admin-
istrative expenses, including those attendant to any eventual liq-
uidation under Chapter 7 of the Code."
C. Valuation
The valuation of the collateral is crucial to a determination
of adequate protection because it is an entity's interest in prop-
erty that must be protected. All of the adequate protection
methods specified in section 361 are based upon the "value of
80. Code section 503(b)(1)(A) provides, in part, that:
[after notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed, administrative expenses...
[including]... the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).
81. Id. § 361(3).
82. 2 COLLIER, supra, note 15, at 1 361.01.
83. 124 CONG. REc. H11,092 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REc. S17,408 (daily
ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 507(b).
85. Id. § 507(b) provides, in substance, that:
If the trustee, under section 362, 363 or 364 of this title, provides adequate protec-
tion of the interest of a holder of a claim secured by a lien on property of the
debtor and if, notwithstanding such protection, such creditor has a claim allowa-
ble under subsection (a)(1) of this section arising from the stay of action against
such property under section 362 of this title, from the use, sale, or lease of such
property under section 363 of this title, or from granting of a lien under section
364(d) of this title, then such creditor's claim under such subsection shall have
priority over every other claim under such subsection.
86. 2 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 1 361.01.
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the protected entity's interest in the collateral involved.117 Sec-
tion 361, however, does not specify how or when value is to be
determined. Congress recognized the continuous development of
new ideas and of the law concerning valuation, and gave the
courts the flexibility to adapt to the circumstances and modes of
financing presented by each case.s
The commission had suggested liquidation value at the date
of the filing of the petition as "a benchmark in determining ade-
quate protection."89 The drafters rejected this approach:
Neither is it expected that the courts will construe the term
value to mean, in every case, forced liquidation value or full going
concern value. There is a wide latitude between those two ex-
tremes. In any particular case, especially a reorganization case,
the determination of which entity should be entitled to the differ-
ence between the going concern value and the liquidation value
must be based on equitable considerations based on the facts of
the case. It will frequently be based on negotiation between the
parties. Only if they cannot agree will the court become
involved.90
The courts have also rejected the forced liquidation mea-
sure. For example, in In re American Kitchen Foods, Inc.,91
where the collateral included inventory and accounts receivable
which could be converted into cash in the orderly course of the
debtor's continuing business, the bankruptcy court decided that
the standard universally applicable in all cases and at every
phase of each case should be "the most commercially reasonable
disposition practicable."" In order to determine what is com-
mercially reasonable in a given case, the court noted it is neces-
sary to weigh factors such as the nature of the debtor's business,
the prospects for rehabilitation, and the nature of the collat-
eral9 8 This approach, based upon equitable, realistic, and practi-
87. H.R. REP., supra note 51, at 339; S. REP., supra note 28, at 54.
88. H.R. REP., supra note 51, at 339; S. RPp., supra note 28, at 54.
89. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 237 n.3.
90. H.R. REP., supra note 51, at 339. It was further noted that the determination of
value has no res judicata effect and is binding only for the purposes of a specific hearing
where the finding is made. S. REP., supra note 25, at 54.
91. In re American Kitchen Foods, Inc., 9 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 537 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1976).
92. Id. at 553.
93. Id. at 552; see 2 CoLLWzR, supra note 18, at 1 361.02.
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cal considerations, should be useful as the courts wrestle with
the valuation issues which arise under the Code."
IV. The Role Of Adequate Protection In Business
Reorganizations
A. Introduction
The drafters of the Code intended that following the filing
of the petition in a Chapter 11 case the debtor or trustee, if ap-
pointed, would continue to operate the debtor's business."5 In-
deed, a successful reorganization will depend most often upon
the continuation of the debtor's business. The Code includes
provisions designed to facilitate continuation of the debtor's
business under the otherwise unmanageable circumstances pre-
cipitated by the filing of the petition:" the automatic stay provi-
sions of section 362;97 the provisions of section 363 concerning
94. The value assigned to the collateral by a secured creditor often may be an im-
portant tactical decision. For example, a creditor asserting a high collateral valuation in
the early stages of a case risks a determination that he is not in need of adequate protec-
tion. Conversely, a low valuation might be unbelievable or can make it easier for the
debtor to satisfy a creditor's claim in a reorganization plan. Moreover, the lower the
value to be protected, the easier it will be to provide adequate protection; if the valua-
tion is too low, it might be determined that the interest is a valueless junior lien unwor-
thy of adequate protection. Valuation should not pass the risk of the debtor's continued
operations to the creditor. On the other hand, premature anticipation of liquidation
should not cause the termination of a case which, if continued, could result in the
debtor's rehabilitation, or at least in a more substantial distribution to creditors. 2 CoL-
LIER, supra note 18, at 1 361.02. A more detailed discussion of valuation is beyond the
scope of this article.
95. Bisbee, Business Reorganization Practice Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 28 EMORY L.J. 709, 724 (1979). Code section 1107 places a debtor-in-possession in
the shoes of a trustee in every way. 11 U.S.C. § 1107. H.R. Rzp., supra note 51, at 404; S.
RFP., supra note 28, at 116. Section 1108 provides that "[uinless the court orders other-
wise, the trustee may operate the debtor's business." 11 U.S.C. § 1108. Appointment of a
trustee or examiner is provided for in section 1104, "for cause, including fraud, dishon-
esty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement. . . or if such appointment is in the inter-
est of creditors." 11 U.S.C. § 1104.
96. Bisbee, supra note 94, at 724. As previously stated, the term debtor will encom-
pass both debtors-in-possession and trustees. See supra note 2.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 362. Chapter 11 is not a self-contained unit. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)
makes the provisions of Chapter 1 (General Provisions, including definitions and rules of
construction), Chapter 3 (Case Administration) and Chapter 5 (Creditors, the Debtor
and the Estate) applicable to cases under Chapters 7, 11 and 13. King, Chapter 11 of the
1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 107, 108 (1979).
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post-petition use, sale or lease of encumbered property;98 and
section 364, which facilitates the obtaining of credit.99
The debtor's ability to provide a secured creditor or other
entity with adequate protection, however, may determine
whether sections 362, 363, and 364 are available to the debtor.
Under section 362(d) the automatic stay must be vacated if a
party in interest requests, unless that party is afforded adequate
protection. Similar protection is afforded by section 363, if col-
lateral is being used, sold or leased, and section 364, if credit is
being obtained by the giving of a lien which is equal or senior to
an existing lien.100 This section will examine the role or adequate
protection in business reorganizations under Chapter 11 by dis-
cussing the conditions in which adequate protection is required
under sections 362, 363, and 364, and by analyzing cases dealing
with adequate protection in reorganizations.
B. Adequate Protection as a Condition for Continuation of
the Automatic Stay
The automatic stay under section 362 is one of the funda-
mental debtor protections supplied by the Code.10' This section
provides for a broad stay of litigation, lien enforcement, and
other judicial and non-judicial actions which would affect or in-
terfere with the debtor's property. 02 The stay, effective upon
98. 11 U.S.C. § 363.
99. Bisbee, supra note 94, at 724.
100. 2 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 1 362.02.
101. H.R. REP., supra note 51, at 340.
102. 11 U.S.C. § 362; see 2 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 1 362.01. The stay is effective
against:
(1) a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor, including the
issuance or employment of process;
(2) the enforcement of a judgment against the debtor or the property of the estate;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of or from the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect or enforce a lien against the debtor's property secur-
ing a pre-petition debt;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a pre-petition claim against the debtor;
(7) setoff of any pre-petition debt owing to the debtor against any claim of the
debtor; and
(8) a proceeding by the debtor before the United States Tax Court.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(8); Kennedy, supra note 6, at 11, 12.
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the filing of the petition,103 applies to virtually "any formal or
informal action against the debtor or property of the estate,"1 "
except for the limitations set forth in section 362(b). 10 5 At the
same time the stay protects creditors by facilitating the equal
treatment of creditors and preventing "a race of diligence for the
debtor's assets."' 0e
Requests by secured creditors for relief from the automatic
stay make up the lion's share of litigation involving adequate
protection under the Code. A party in interest can request relief,
under section 362(d)(1), such as termination, modification, an-
nulment, or conditioning of the stay "for cause, including the
lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such
party in interest. '1 0 7 Thirty days after the request, the auto-
matic stay terminates with respect to the entity seeking relief
from the stay. The court, after notice and hearing, however, may
continue the stay. If the hearing on relief is preliminary, the
court will continue the stay upon a showing of reasonable likeli-
hood that the debtor will prevail at the final hearing. The final
103. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); 2 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 362.03.
104. 2 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 362.04. The stay gives the debtor "a breathing
spell from his creditors. It stops all collection efforts, all harassment and all foreclosure
actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a reorganization or repayment plan, or simply
to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy." H.R. REP.,
supra note 51, at 340; S. REP., supra note 28, at 54.
105. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b). Among the exceptions to the stay are criminal proceedings,
the collection of alimony, maintenance or support, an action by a governmental unit to
enforce its police or regulatory power, and the issuance to the debtor by a governmental
unit of a notice of a tax deficiency. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(1),(2),(8).
106. H. REP., supra note 51, at 340; S. REP., supra note 28, at 49. In determining
whether to lift the automatic stay, a court must balance and harmonize the "counter-
vailing and competing interests" of the secured creditors, the unsecured creditors, and
the debtor. E.g., In re First Century Trust Co., 12 Bankr. 204, 208 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1981)(court refused to grant a second mortgagee relief from the stay and allow foreclo-
sure where to do so would deprive priority and unsecured creditors of an opportunity to
receive any portion of their debts, and the debtor of an opportunity to reorganize).
107. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). In addition to lack of adequate protection, "cause" may
also include factors such as: a desire to permit the conclusion of an action in another
tribunal or the lack of any connection or interference with the bankruptcy case, such as a
divorce or child custody proceedings, or where the debtor is a fiduciary. H.R. REP., supra
note 51, at 343-44; S. REP., supra note 28, at 52. See In re Sulzer, 2 Bankr. 630 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1980). A debtor's baseless delaying tactics have been held to be sufficient cause
for lifting the stay. See In re GSVC Restaurant Corp., 10 Bankr. 300 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1980). The debtor's delaying tactics, coupled with his failure to propose a method of
adequate protection, prompted the court to grant the landlord relief from the automatic
stay.
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hearing must commence within thirty days after the preliminary
hearing.108 The only issues considered at a hearing on relief from
the stay are the creditor's claim, the lack of adequacy of protec-
tion, and the existence of other reasons for relief from the
stay.109 The debtor will have the burden of proof on the issue of
adequate protection and all other issues1 except the issue of
the debtor's interest in the property."' In certain circumstances,
such as if the protection afforded such creditor becomes inade-
quate because of changed circumstances or if the debtor fails to
afford the adequate protection offered,"' a creditor who has
been denied relief from the stay may successfully renew his re-
quest for such relief.
A creditor's request for relief from the stay may be denied if
the debtor provides adequate protection in the form of periodic
payments. In In re A.L.S., Inc.,"8 prior to the filing of the peti-
tion, the Chapter 11 debtor had subleased from the creditor
premises in a shopping center. After the debtor defaulted on its
rental payments the creditor terminated the lease. Following the
108. 11 U.S.C. § 362(e).
109. H.R. REP., supra note 51, at 344; S. REP., supra note 28, at 55. Such a hearing
is not the appropriate time to litigate other issues, such as the debtor's counterclaims
against the creditor on largely unrelated matters. See In re High Sky, Inc., 15 Bankr. 332
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1981); In re Executive Leasing Corp., 3 Bankr. 261, 262 (Bankr. D.P.R.
1980). Even if a debtor's affirmative defenses and counterclaims are valid, a secured
creditor seeking relief from the stay is entitled to adequate protection until there is a
rendering of a final nonappealable judgment, which avoids or diminishes the pre-petition
contract at issue. In re High Sky, Inc., 15 Bankr. at 337 (citing In re Born, 10 Bankr. 43
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981)).
110. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g). The statute refers to the "party opposing" relief from the
stay. See generally 2 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 1 362.10.
111. The debtor's interest in the property is relevant because 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)
provides that, in addition to cause, including lack of adequate protection, relief from a
stay of an act against property shall be granted if the debtor has no equity in such
property and such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. See, e.g., In re
Mikole Dev., Inc., 14 Bankr. 524, 526 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Clark Technical
Assoc., 9 Bankr. 738 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981). See also In re Saint Peter's School, 16
Bankr. 404 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Riviera Inn of Wallingford, Inc., 7 Bankr. 725
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1980).
112. Relief from the stay is available whenever one of the alternate tests set forth in
section 362(d) is met. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). In denying relief from the stay, courts often
invite the party seeking relief to renew its application should the debtor not provide the
adequate protection ordered or agreed to, see, e.g., In re A.L.S., Inc., 3 Bankr. 107
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980), or if future circumstances warrant such renewal. See, e.g., In re
Spilsbury, 5 Bankr. 578, 582 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980).
113. 3 Bankr. 107 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
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filing of the petition, the creditor filed a complaint for relief
from the stay to obtain permission to bring an action to obtain
possession of the premises. The court denied the relief, in part,
because it could provide adequate protection for the creditor by
ordering the debtor to pay all rents and charges coming due
thereafter under the lease. In addition, the debtor was required
to deposit approximately three months rent with the creditor
and to pay the creditor all amounts due under the lease.1" '
In re Economy Trucking, Inc.115 involved a creditor seeking
termination of the stay in order to continue foreclosure proceed-
ings on vehicles in which the creditor had a security interest and
of which the creditor had obtained possession through a writ of
replevin. The court directed the creditor to return the vehicles
to the debtor upon the debtor's demonstration of its ability to
procure the necessary insurance 16 on the vehicles, and to lease
the vehicles. In addition, the debtor was ordered to resume
monthly installment payments and, within six months, to bring
current all arrearages. 17
A secured creditor's request for relief from the stay was de-
nied in In re Gamy & Levy Associates, Inc.118 in part because
the Chapter 11 trustee offered adequate protection in the form
of a replacement lien. The court held that the secured creditor
was adequately protected by the trustee's assurances, that the
creditor would have a lien on the proceeds of any sale of collat-
114. Id. at 109. See also In re Mulkey of Missouri, Inc., 5 Bankr. 15 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1980).
115. 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 997 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1980).
116. Requiring a debtor to obtain insurance is an example of the flexibility and
adaptability of the concept of adequate protection. See In re El Patio, Ltd., 6 Bankr. 518
(Bankr. C.D. Ca. 1980)(where value of real property is not expected to decrease, ade-
quate protection is provided by debtor's prorated payment of accruing taxes and penal-
ties, coupled with adequate assurance that the property is maintained and insured); see
also In re Ryals, 3 Bankr. 522 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980)(insurance on an automobile is
sufficient adequate protection in a Chapter 13 case).
117. In re Economy Trucking, Inc., 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) at 999. See also
In re Ryals, 3 Bankr. 522 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980). Periodic payments will not always
provide adequate protection. Relief from the stay has been granted in a case where pay-
ments offered by the debtor exceeded the monthly payments required on mortgages held
by a secured creditor, but not where the guarantor of the mortgages was faced with fore-
closures on other property to satisfy the lender's requirement of full payment. In re
Macare Enterprises, Inc., 4 Bankr. 520 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
118. Barnett Bank of Broward County v. Freehling (In re Gamy & Levy Assoc.), 2
COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 21 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
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eral in which it had security and in which the debtor had equity,
and that property in which the debtor had no equity would ei-
ther be abandoned or sold with the creditor's consent, unless
needed to operate the debtor's business, in which case the trus-
tee would pay a reasonable charge for use.119
Relief from the stay will also be granted unless the debtor
can provide a secured creditor seeking relief with the "indubita-
ble equivalent" of such creditor's interest in the collateral. In In
re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.,20 as a result of the debtor's
breach of a security agreement, a secured creditor cancelled the
agreement, under which it had a security interest in the debtor's
inventory and some additional property of the debtor. Following
the debtor's filing of a petition for relief under Chapter 11, the
creditor sought relief from the stay. The court granted relief, in
part because the creditor was not adequately protected. The
court compared the value of what the creditor would receive if
the stay were continued and a plan confirmed with what the
creditor would receive if the stay were lifted immediately.121 The
court reasoned that, upon confirmation of a plan, the creditor
would be entitled to the present value equivalent1 21 of its al-
lowed secured claim, the value of the collateral on the plan's ef-
fective date. The creditor would be uncompensated, however, for
the loss of the use of its money from the date of the proceeding
for relief from the stay to the date of the confirmation of a plan,
because the debtor had no equity cushion upon which interest
payments under section 506 could be based.12 3 The court con-
119. Id. at 22-23; see also In re Auto-Train Corp. 6 Bankr. 510 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1980)(adequate protection is provided by cash payments to the extent funds are suffi-
cient, and, if necessary, by assignment of unencumbered credit charges and liens on all
unencumbered assets).
120. 4 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1980).
121. Id. at 642. The court stated that the secured creditor would face an undue risk
of harm if the stay were continued because under § 9-306 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, U.C.C. § 9-306 (1972), the creditor could lose its security in cash proceeds which
had been commingled. The court also noted that the debtor had no reasonable possibil-
ity of reorganization and had no equity in the collateral. In re Anchorage Boat Sales,
Inc., 4 Bankr. at 642.
122. In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 Bankr. at 643. The court defined present
value of the collateral as the amount the secured creditor would realize if he had in his
hands today an amount equal to the collateral's value and was able to reinvest this
amount in a way which would produce a return on such investment. Id.
123. Under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) a secured creditor is entitled to interest only to the
1982]
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cluded that because "payment ten years hence is not generally
the equivalent of payment now," the creditor would not, absent
relief from the stay, receive the "indubitable equivalent" of its
interest.124 A contrary result, however, has been reached in at
least one other case. In In re American Mariner Industries,
Inc., 2 5 the court disagreed with Anchorage Boat, concluding
that the right of an undersecured creditor to receive interest on
the value of its collateral is not constitutionally protected by the
fifth amendment, nor does section 361 require it as a policy
matter.
12 6
Prior to filing a Chapter 11 petition, the debtor in In re
Paradise Boat Leasing Corp.17 defaulted on a loan secured by
the debtor's sole asset, a yacht. The court granted the secured
creditor, a finance company, relief from the stay in order to en-
force its lien on the yacht. The court stated that indubitable
equivalence is the general test of adequate protection which re-
quired that the debtor's "payment. . .[to the secured creditor]
must be at least as good as provided by his agreement."' Is On
appeal by the debtor, the district court held that a misinterpre-
extent that the collateral's value exceeds his allowed secured claim. In In re Anchorage
Boat Sales, where there was a deficiency instead of an excess, the secured creditor would
have had an unsecured claim for the deficiency, but would have no right to interest on
the unsecured portion of the claim. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a),(b).
124. In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 Bankr. 635 (citing In re Murel Holding
Corp., 75 F.2d 941, 943 (2d Cir. 1935).
125. 10 Bankr. 711 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981).
126. American Mariner, id., criticized the In re Anchorage Boat Sales interpreta-
tion of In re Murel stating that:
Although Muriel Holding [sic] ... is the source of the phrase "indubitable
equivalent" as used in § 361(3), it should be remembered that the ruling in Muriel
Holding [sic] involved adequate protection of a secured creditor being "crammed
down" under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. Therefore, indubitable equivalent in
the context of the Muriel Holding [sic] facts may be precedent for issues arising
upon confirmation under § 1129(b)(2)(i)(II), but not to require interest to be paid
to an undersecured creditor for being temporarily deprived of possession or use of
its collateral.
In re American Mariner Industries, Inc., 10 Bankr. at 712.
127. In re Paradise Boat Leasing Corp., 2 Bankr. 482 (Bankr. D.V.I. 1979).
128. Id. at 483. Despite the debtor's substantial equity in the yacht, the bankruptcy
court found that there was no adequate protection of the secured creditor's interest in
the yacht because of the yacht's mobility and vulnerability to the perils of the sea. In
addition, the court commented that the debtor's Chapter 11 petition appeared to be a
mere attempt to forestall a particular secured creditor and that the debtor's business was
conducted in a most unbusinesslike manner.
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tation of section 361(3) by the bankruptcy court rendered sus-
pect the termination of the stay.'2" Moreover, the district court
noted that "as a court of equity the bankruptcy court is free to
balance the hardships to the affected parties and fashion relief
accordingly." 130 The case was remanded to the bankruptcy court
for a determination whether less drastic relief could be fash-
ioned, such as requiring the debtor to acquire sufficient insur-
ance on the yacht. 181 The district court noted: "[t]he statute de-
mands the 'mere indubitable equivalent rather than the most
indubitable equivalence' .... Thus, 'where the creditor is in the
business of extending credit a moratorium on debt service if ac-
companied by measures to preserve the collateral may
suffice."' 131
Sometimes the debtor's equity in the collateral exceeds the
secured creditor's claim. While this "equity cushion"188 can itself
constitute adequate protection,'" the court will examine the eq-
uity cushion to ensure that it is large enough to truly protect the
secured creditor's interest in the collateral."" In In re San Cle-
129. In re Paradise Boat Leasing Corp., 5 Bankr. 822, (Bankr. D.V.I. 1980).
130. Id. at 825 (citing 2 CoLLimp, supra note 18, at 362.07).
131. In re Paradise Boat Leasing Corp., 5 Bankr. at 825. The court noted that the
bankruptcy court had raised little objection to the debtor's reorganization plan, except
for the lack of adequate protection of the secured creditor's interest in the yacht. Ac-
cordingly, the district court believed that if this obstacle could be overcome, the plan
would probably be acceptable. Id. at 824.
132. Id. at 825 (citing 2 CoLu~m supra, note 18, at 1 361.01, 1 362.07 (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted).
133. 2 CoLLE supra note 18, at 361.01. An equity cushion has been defined as
"the surplus of value remaining after the amount of indebtedness is subtracted from the
fair market value of the collateral." In re Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State Employ-
ees' Retirement Fund, 14 Bankr. 542, 545 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981)(citing In re Pitts, 2
Bankr. at 478)). In determining whether an equity cushion exists, all encumbrances are
totalled, regardless of whether all lienholders have joined in the request for relief from
the stay. In re Mikole Developers, Inc., 14 Bankr. 524, 525 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981)(citing
In re Dallastra, 7 Bankr. 883 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980)).
134. 2 CoLLm, supra note 18, at 1 361.01; see, e.g., In re High Sky, Inc., 15 Bankr.
332 (M.D. Pa. 1981)(cushion held insufficient and relief from stay granted); In re Pitts, 2
Bankr. 476, 479 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1979)(court reluctantly continued the stay as to a
second mortgagee based on a $19,125.00 cushion on a chapter 13 debtor's residence).
135. While the protection of a creditor's cushion is not constitutionally required, the
courts will not always permit the cushion to be eroded. 2 Cowan, supra note 18, at 1
361.01. "In some instances the courts have acceded to the secured creditors' argument
that the original bargain called for an equity cushion and that foreclosure is proper when
the cushion is reduced to a minimal value, or disappears." In re Hutton-Johnson Co.,
Inc., 6 Bankr. 855, 859 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)(citing In re Pitta, 2 Bankr. 476, 478
19821
23
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:1
mente Estates,5 6 a bank sought relief from the stay to continue
foreclosure proceedings against land upon which it held a deed
of trust. The court found that the land's fair market value ex-
ceeded the encumbrances by $2.1 million. The court held that
this "equity cushion," over 65% more than the encumbrances,
constituted adequate protection. 8 7 The court cited In re Lake
Tahoe Land Co.'38 where the debt exceeded the value of the
property.' 39 In vacating the stay, the court stated that "adequate
protection for a lender, as opposed to a seller, for land, even raw
land partly developed by roads, sewer and water, is a leverage of
40-50% of the market value.' ' 4 0 The court in San Clemente cau-
tioned, however, that while the Lake Tahoe standard may "have
the salutory effect of giving precise guidance to the standard to
be used . . .it does seem to be inconsistent with the congres-
sional intent that each case is to be judged on its own facts.'1'
If the equity cushion is small, or is being eroded by the
debtor's inability to pay current interest and carrying charges,
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1979)). See In re Tucker, 5 Bankr. 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re
Lake Tahoe Land Co., 5 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980). It does not follow, however,
that adequate protection is "designed to put the secured creditor in the same position it
was in when it initially negotiated the transaction." In re Hutton-Johnson Co., Inc., 6
Bankr. at 860.
136. 5 Bankr. 605 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980).
137. Id. at 610.
138. In re Lake Tahoe Land Co., 5 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980). 1f the secured
creditor's claim exceeds the value of the collateral, there is no cushion and the debtor
will have to provide adequate protection or be faced with the secured creditor's relief
from the stay. See, e.g., In re Hutton-Johnson Co., Inc., 6 Bankr. 855 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1980); In re Terra Mar Assoc., 3 Bankr. 462 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980).
139. While "[i]n certain instances the property alone may provide a sufficient cush-
ion for a secured creditor so as to justify a continuance of the status quo," In re Thomas
Parker Enterprises, Inc., 10 Bankr. 783, 789 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981), absent an equity
cushion, courts will grant relief from the stay unless the debtor affords the secured credi-
tor some additional protection. Id. at 789-90; In re Riviera Inn of Wallingford, Inc., 7
Bankr. 725, 729 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980); In re Hutton-Johnson Co., Inc., 6 Bankr. 855,
859 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also In re St. Peter's School, 16 Bankr. 404 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982) where the total encumbrances on real property collateral exceeded its
value, a first mortgagee bank was permitted to consummate a foreclosure sale. The court
refused to continue the stay, which would have allowed the debtor to consider an offer to
purchase the collateral. This purchase offer was held to be insufficient to satisfy the
debtor's affirmative duty to "propose debtor's protections of the secured interest." Id. at.
410-11.
140. In re Lake Tahoe Land Co., 5 Bankr. at 37.
141. In re San Clemente Estates, 5 Bankr. at 610.
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the court will often grant relief from the stay.14 ' The existence of
an equity cushion, however, is only one factor courts consider
when deciding whether adequate protection has been afforded. 143
Courts may consider anticipated appreciation of the property in
holding that a cushion is sufficient despite accruing interest and
costs.14 ' Where an equity cushion is not by itself sufficient, it
may be combined with cash payments1 45 or a lien on additional
property to adequately protect a secured creditor's interest.4 6 A
court should consider the cumulative effect of the facts before it
because "the adequacy of protection afforded by an equity cush-
ion, stated either as a dollar amount or as a percentage of the
estimated fair market value of the property, must ultimately be
determined upon equitable considerations arising from the par-
ticular facts of each proceeding."14 7 This approach is consistent
142. See In re Castle Ranch of Ramona, Inc., 3 Bankr. 45 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980);
see also In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 810 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
143. See, e.g., In re Pannell, 12 Bankr. 51 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
144. See, e.g., In re Rogers Dev. Corp., 2 Bankr. 679 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
145. See, e.g., In re McGowan, 6 Bankr. 241 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); In re Spilsbury,
5 Bankr. 578 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980); In re Breuer, 4 Bankr. 499 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980);
In re Walker, 3 Bankr. 213 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
146. See, e.g., In re Schockley Forest Indus. Inc., 5 Bankr. 160 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1980).
147. In re High Sky, Inc., 15 Bankr. 332, 336 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1981)(citing In re
Tucker, 5 Bankr. 180, 183 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)). Because the amount of the cushion is
dependent upon the value attributed to the property involved, valuation is an important
issue in determining whether an equity cushion constitutes adequate protection in a
given case. An in depth discussion of valuation is beyond the scope of this article. In re
High Sky., Inc. is an excellent example of a court considering all relevant information
concerning the debtor and the collateral. The court terminated the stay finding that the
debtor had failed to sustain the burden that it had afforded the secured creditor ade-
quate protection. The court based its holding on the following factors: an eroding equity
cushion due to accumulating interest; absence of a sufficient equity cushion; no evidence
that the property was appreciating significantly; debtor's failure to offer protection in
addition to the property itself so as to satisfy the "indubitable equivalent" requirement;
debtor's failure to propose a plan of reorganization in the five months following the filing
of the petition; poor prospects for successful reorganization due to economic conditions;
and debtor's apparent filing of its petition to forestall the pending foreclosure sale which
had first been listed in 1976. In re High Sky, 15 Bankr. at 336.
One court, however, has rejected the equity cushion analysis on several grounds.
First, the equity cushion is inconsistent with the purpose of adequate protection, which
is to guard against lien impairments. Second, it concentrates on the preservation of eq-
uity, which is inconsistent with the illustrations of adequate protection set forth in sec-
tion 361; these illustrations address compensation for a decrease in the value of the prop-
erty due to the stay. Third, it is inconsistent with the statutory scheme of section
362(d)(2), which requires a showing that the property is unnecessary to an effective reor-
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with the flexibility intended for the adequate protection concept,
and particularly for the indubitable equivalence method of pro-
viding adequate protection.'"
C. Adequate Protection as a Condition for the Use, Sale, or
Lease of Property
The impact of the automatic stay might be affected by con-
sideration of how the collateral may be used by the debtor or
trustee during the stay. While use of collateral might be essen-
tial to the debtor's successful rehabilitation by allowing him to
continue in his business, the collateral might be partially or
completely consumed, thereby rendering irrelevant the status of
the stay.14" Section 363 permits the debtor within prescribed
limits to use, sell, or lease property of the estate. In the ordinary
course of business, a debtor may use, sell, or lease property with-
out notice or hearing,150 but may not use, sell, or lease cash col-
lateral1 5 2 unless the secured party consents 5 2 or the court so
permits.153 Outside the ordinary course of business, property of
the estate may be used, sold, or leased only after notice and a
hearing.15 Moreover, the trustee's use, sale, or lease of property
ganization, in addition to a lack of equity, rather than a specific equity cushion. Finally,
the court felt that the equity cushion concept has no historical basis in the development
of stay litigation. In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 809-12 (Bankr. D. Utah
1981).
148. Adequate protection was designed to mediate the polarities created by that
"turbulent rivalry of interests in reorganization." In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12
Bankr. 803, 805 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). This requires "not a formula, but a calculus,
opentextured, pliant and versatile, adaptable to 'new ideas' which are 'continually being
implemented in this field' and to 'varying circumstances and changing modes of financ-
ing."' Id. (citing H.R. REP., supra note 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws AT 6295).
149. 2 COLLIER, supra note 18, at 363.01.
150. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1).
151. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) defines "cash collateral" as "cash, negotiable instruments,
documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents in which the
estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest."
152. Id. § 363(c)(2)(A).'
153. Id. § 363(c)(2)(B).
154. Id. § 363(b). 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) defines "after notice and a hearing" as such
notice and opportunity for a hearing as is appropriate in the particular circumstances.
An act may be done without an actual hearing if a timely request for a hearing is not
made or there is insufficient time for a hearing and the court authorizes the act.
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may not be inconsistent with any relief granted from the stay.""5
Section 363(e) provides that a secured party may at any
time request that the court prohibit or condition the use, sale, or
lease of collateral in order to provide the creditor with adequate
protection. As under section 362(d), such adequate protection is
mandated if requested by a secured party'" and the debtor has
the burden of proving that the protection he proposes is ade-
quate.157 The following cases illustrate the application of these
principles.
In In re Markim, Inc.,'" the debtor, a lessor-seller of con-
struction equipment, entered into an agreement with secured
creditors whereby the debtor granted them a blanket lien on its
accounts receivable, its equity in rental equipment, and other
property. Following the filing of a Chapter 11 petition, the
debtor applied for permission to use cash collateral. The bank-
ruptcy court granted this application over the objections of se-
cured and unsecured creditors. The court held that the debtor
had sustained its burden by establishing that the secured credi-
tors' interests were adequately protected by the existence of suf-
ficient equity in the debtor's property. The court noted, how-
ever, that even if the equity were insufficient, the secured
creditors were adequately protected by the debtor's provisions to
make monthly payments to the secured creditor, and the signifi-
cant improvements in the efficiency of the debtor's operation.' 59
The debtor in In re Xinde International, Inc.'"0 had suffi-
cient equity in its equipment and fixtures to secure and main-
tain a 50% equity cushion relevant to a secured debt. The se-
cured creditor opposed an application to use cash collateral and
sought relief from the stay. The debtor was unable, however, to
generate sufficient cash to purchase new materials needed to
manufacture its product. Recognizing the need to balance credi-
tor protection against the likelihood of a successful reorganiza-
tion, the court stated:
155. Id. § 363(d).
156. 2 CoLLIER, supra note 18, at 363.06.
157. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e).
158. 15 Bankr. 56 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
159. Id. at 59.
160. 13 Bankr. 212 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
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While it is true that use of cash collateral in an ongoing business
to maintain its business activity may enhance the estate, and that
the collateral would ordinarily be replenisd as the business con-
tinues, a particular creditor can have realistic fears that replen-
ishment of the cash collateral will not occur.161
Because of the debtor's apparent ability to replenish the collat-
eral from current operations, and because of the existence of a
substantial equity cushion, the court permitted debtor's use of
cash collateral, without payments to the creditor for a ninety
day period, during which time the debtor was directed to formu-
late a plan. An equity cushion in depreciating equipment does
not provide adequate protection for long; therefore, if the debtor
were unable to formulate and confirm a plan within the ninety
days, the creditor would be permitted an immediate hearing to
reconsider its request for periodic cash payments."6 '
The creditor in In re Anderson-Walker Industries, Inc.,168
the Small Business Administration, held a security interest in
the debtor's accounts receivable and other assets, and opposed
the debtor's application for permission to use the accounts re-
ceivable. The court permitted the debtor to use the accounts re-
ceivable on the condition that the debtor continue making
monthly payments on its SBA loan.'" In re Aurora Cord and
Cable Co.1  involved an Internal Revenue Service lien on the
161. Id. at 215.
162. Id. at 215-16. It has been held that, without an unconstitutional impairment of
the security agreement, a bankruptcy court may require a creditor, who collected ac-
counts receivable due the debtor under a security agreement, to pay the proceeds from
pre-petition accounts receivable to the debtor, if such proceeds are necessary for the
continuation of the debtor's business and if the debtor has other sufficient collateral to
satisfy the secured indebtedness. In re Able Sheet Metal, Inc., 15 Bankr. 878 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 1981). The court in Able refused, however, to direct the secured creditor to pay
accounts receivable proceeds to the debtor because the debtor failed to establish that
there was other sufficient collateral to satisfy the creditor's claim. The court cited In re
American Kitchen Foods, Inc., 9 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 537 (Bankr. N.D. Me.
1976), where the court released funds recovered by the debtor prior to the filing of the
reorganization petition, but authorized additional collateral as protection against any
diminution of the creditor's security interest. In re Able Sheet Metal, Inc., 15 Bankr. at
883.
163. In re Anderson-Walker Indus., Inc., 3 Bankr. 551 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980).
164. Id. at 552. The court stated that it "borders on the frivolous for the SBA to
argue that it is not adequately protected when the liquidation value of the collateral is
7.3 times the amount of the secured indebtedness." Id.
165. 2 Bankr. 342 (Bankr. N.D. IlM. 1980).
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debtor's cash and receivables. The court fashioned an elaborate
structure of adequate protection which included the requirement
that the debtor open an escrow account with an immediate
$20,000.00 deposit and periodic deposits thereafter."" Prior to
commencing a reorganization case, the debtor in In re Inforex,
Inc.187 financed through various banks purchases of equipment
for lease in the course of its business. Under the terms of secur-
ity agreements with the banks, lessees of debtor's equipment re-
mitted payments to depository accounts maintained by the
debtor. The court granted the debtor's application for permis-
sion to use the proceeds of its leases to maintain its business,
finding that adequate protection was provided by two measures:
the continued remittance to the depository accounts of rental
payments; and the treatment of the debtor's obligation to the
banks as a loan entitled to a first priority expense of administra-
tion status and secured by a security interest in substantially all
of the debtor's assets.'"
In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.,1"a a Chapter 11 case
filed on October 1, 1979, the Code's effective date, involved an
application by the debtor for permission to use cash collateral. A
security agreement granted the secured creditors' security inter-
ests in all of the debtor's accounts receivable and the proceeds of
such accounts. Under this agreement, the debtor could use the
proceeds so long as it maintained cash proceeds in a collateral
account and current accounts receivable aggregating 140% of
the unpaid balance owed to the secured creditors. The court ac-
cepted the debtor's proposal for adequate protection, by which
the debtor agreed to turn over to the secured creditors all pre-
petition uncollected accounts receivable and any cash held in
166. Id. at 347. In addition, the court ordered the debtor to not replace four recently
terminated employees, reduce the salaries of two of the debtor's executives, and permit
IRS agents to monitor the debtor's compliance with the court's order and to examine its
books periodically. The court also granted the IRS liens on the debtor's accounts receiva-
ble, inventory, machinery, and equipment and, in the event the IRS became an un-
secured creditor, raised its priority from sixth to second. The court further directed that
half of any settlement of three claims pending against the government be deposited in
the escrow account. Finally, the debtor was required to provide monthly financial state-
ments. Id. at 347-48.
167. 10 Bankr. 497 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1979).
168. Id. at 499-500.
169. In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., No. 79-01238, slip op. (N.D. Ohio 1979).
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the collateral accounts, and in substitution for cash proceeds
used from pre-petition receivables collected prior to the hearing,
to give the secured creditors a lien on specified real estate.1 70
In In re Kenny Kar Leasing, Inc.,17 1 a bank, which financed
purchases of vehicles by a Chapter 11 debtor in the car leasing
business, sought an order prohibiting the debtor from using any
cash collateral in which the bank had an interest. The debtor
argued that the personal guarantee by the debtor's principal of
the debtor's obligations to the bank was the equivalent of an
additional or replacement lien. The court rejected this argu-
ment, stating that "[tlo compel a secured creditor to accept such
risks on the basis of rights to pursue a guarantor, is to shift the
hazards and the costs of the rehabilitation effort from the debtor
to the secured creditor. '17' The court found this to be outside
"the concept of adequate protection embodied in the Code. 17' 8
D. Adequate Protection as a Condition for Obtaining Credit
When income from the debtor's business is insufficient to
cover operating expenses during a reorganization, the business
cannot operate unless the debtor or trustee is able to obtain the
necessary credit to finance the operations. 1 4 Thus, section 364
empowers the debtor or trustee to obtain credit under specified
conditions. The debtor may obtain unsecured credit and incur
unsecured debt in the ordinary course of business, under section
364(a), unless the court orders otherwise, and outside the ordi-
nary course of business under section 364(b), after notice and a
hearing. 17 5 In both cases the debts so incurred are allowable as
administrative expenses under section 503(b)(1).1 7 6 If the debtor
is unable to obtain unsecured credit under section 503(b)(1), the
170. Id. slip op. at 7-8; see also In re Thompson, 5 Bankr. 667 (Bankr. D. S. D.
1980)(security interest transferred to future money crops).
171. 5 Bankr. 304 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980). But see H.R. REP., supra note 51, at 340,
where it was suggested that adequate protection under section 361(3) (indubitable equiv-
alence) may be provided by a third person's guarantee, outside the judicial process, of
compensation for any loss incurred in the case.
172. In re Kenny Kar Leasing, Inc., 5 Bankr. at 309.
173. Id.
174. Bisbee, supra note 94, at 734.
175. 11 U.S.C. § 364(b).
176. Id. § 364; see also Bisbee, supra note 94.
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court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the debtor or
trustee to obtain credit or incur debt by providing the post-peti-
tion creditor with priority over all administrative expenses speci-
fied in sections 503(b) and 507(b), a lien on unencumbered prop-
erty, or a junior lien on encumbered property. 1 "
If the debtor is unable to obtain credit through any of the
previously mentioned methods, section 364(d)(1) empowers the
court, after notice and hearing, to authorize the debtor or trus-
tee to obtain credit or incur debt secured by a senior or equal
lien on encumbered property.178 A condition precedent to the
granting of this so-called "superpriority" is adequate protection
of the prior lienor's interest.17' The debtor or trustee has the
burden of proof on the issue of adequate protection.180
The debtor in In re Stratbucker,18' a farmer without the
funds necessary to plant his spring crops, could obtain credit
only if he could furnish post-petition creditors with a section
364(c) superpriority. The court granted the debtor's application
finding that three objecting lien creditors were adequately pro-
tected because the value of the debtor's real estate exceeded the
debt. The superpriority was limited, however, to the proceeds of
crops grown with the funds advanced under written contracts
bearing interest not in excess of 18%.182 The court was influ-
enced by the fact that the debtor's sole chance at rehabilitation
was to continue his farming operation.
V. Potential Difficulties In Applying The Concept Of
Adequate Protection
As the courts and the bar gain more experience with ade-
quate protection under the Code, some problems requiring reso-
lution may arise. Debtors may often find it difficult to provide
177. Bisbee, supra note 94, at 734-35. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c). There is no statutory
or constitutional requirement that adequate protection be afforded to the holders of un-
secured claims whose recoveries may be impaired by credit obtained under section
364(c)(2) even if the lender is provided with a lien on property of the estate not other-
wise encumbered. In re Garland Corp., 6 Bankr. 456 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1980).
178. Bisbee, supra note 94, at 735; 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1).
179. 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1).
180. Id. § 364(d)(2).
181. 4 Bankr. 251 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1980).
182. Id.
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periodic cash payments,183 or may not have sufficient unencum-
bered property to provide additional or replacement liens. More-
over, inflation and high interest rates are bound to make it diffi-
cult for debtors to afford secured creditors adequate protection.
The volatility of interest rates might render inadequate what in-
itially appears to be adequate protection. In addition, a debtor
who provides one creditor with adequate protection may be
faced with demands from other creditors for similar treat-
ment.1" If a debtor cannot afford a secured creditor adequate
protection, however, the prospects for rehabilitation are poor. It
would be inequitable to foist the uncertainties of such a debtor's
future upon a secured creditor.
Another potential problem for litigants is some apparent
uncertainty over the meaning of "indubitable equivalent."' " Re-
lying on the language in the legislative history of section 361,
which states that a secured creditor is entitled to the benefit of
his bargain, 1" some courts have interpreted "indubitable equiv-
alence" to mean all to which the creditor would be entitled
under the contract at issue.187 The district court in Paradise
Boat Leasing criticized this approach, noting that a mere indu-
bitable equivalent, not the most indubitable equivalent, is re-
quired.1" Although adequate protection is to be afforded accord-
ing to the circumstances and equities of each case, more
certainty may be needed in this area. This certainty may well be
provided by future decisions.
183. 2 CoLLmis, supra note 18, at 361.01.
184. See In re Yale Express System, Inc. (Yale Express II), 384 F.2d at 992.
185. The indubitable equivalence requirement has been criticized in a case involving
an application for relief from the automatic stay:
Indubitable equivalence is not a method; nor does it have substantive content.
Indeed, something "indubitable" is more than "adequate;" "equivalent" is more
than "protection;" hence, the illustration may eclipse the concept. At best, it is a
semantic substitute for adequate protection and one with dubious, not indubita-
ble, application to the question of relief from the stay.
In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 809 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
186. H.R. REP., supra note 51, at 339; S. REP., supra note 28.
187. See, e.g., In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1980); In re Paradise Boat Leasing Corp., 2 Bankr. 482 (Bankr. D.V.I. 1979), rev'd, 5
Bankr. 822 (D.V.I. 1980). It is noteworthy that in each of these cases the bankruptcy
court was highly critical of the manner in which the debtor had operated. See also supra
note 135 and cases cited therein.
188. In re Paradise Boat Leasing Corp., 5 Bankr. at 825.
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VI. Conclusion
The concept of adequate protection as embodied in the
Code represents:
[A] statutory effort to provide rules of fairness and equity to gov-
ern, adjust and balance the rights of secured creditors and debt-
ors... [t]he adequate protection provisions are an effort to bal-
ance these conflicting interests; to grant the debtor the right to
continue enjoyment and exploitation of property and assets upon
which rehabilitation depends, not at the expense of secured credi-
tors, but on terms which protect secured creditors in the realiza-
tion of the value of their interests in such property and assets.18'
This article has traced the development of adequate protection
and has discussed the circumstances under which the Code and
the cases interpreting the Code require adequate protection.
Sections 362, 363, and 364, which state when adequate pro-
tection is required, and section 361, which provides examples of
adequate protection, have resolved many uncertainties concern-
ing the use of collateral by a debtor in reorganization. The
courts have used adequate protection as the flexible concept the
drafters intended. This is evidenced by cases in which different
forms of adequate protection have been combined to fit the
circumstances.1 90
The concept of adequate protection goes to the very essence
of business reorganizations under Chapter 11 of the Code. A
debtor can avail itself of the protection of the automatic stay to
use, sell, or lease property and to obtain credit. At the same time
secured creditors are provided with the protection to which they
are constitutionally entitled. Adequate protection may en-
courage a spirit of cooperation and negotiation between the
debtor and its secured creditor, since it is to both parties' advan-
tage to confirm a plan to revitalize the debtor's business, and to
provide adequate protection in the interim. Thus, while the very
flexibility of adequate protection may lead to uncertainty in its
application, the concept is beneficial to the administration of
business reorganizations under Chapter 11 of the Code.
189. In re Kenny Kar Leasing, Inc., 5 Bankr. 305, 308 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1980) (em-
phasis in original).
190. See, e.g., In re Aurora Cord & Cable Co., 2 Bankr. 342 (Bankr. N.D. MI1. 1980).
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